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Scope of Liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute: The Relevance of Choice of Law 
Doctrine in the Aftermath of Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum 
 
Jon E. Crain

 
 
Recently Judge José A. Cabranes, of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, issued a decision that drastically undermined the 
efficacy of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Writing for the majority in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 
Judge Cabranes ruled that corporate entities cannot be held liable under 
the ATS. This Comment will examine the choice-of-law aspect of that 
decision, and argue that Judge Cabranes erred in interpreting the ATS to 
mandate application of customary international law (CIL). 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves 
me and causes me to tremble for the safety of my 
country . . . corporations have been enthroned and an era 
of corruption in high places will follow, and the money 
power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign 
by working upon the prejudices of the people until all 
wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is 
destroyed.
1
 
 
 Many readers might assume that this quotation is contemporary. 
From Enron to Lehman, the past decade has provided numerous 
examples of corporate corruption and malfeasance.
2
 President Lincoln’s 
 
   J.D., Pace University School of Law. The Author would like to thank his wife 
Katie, his parents, and all of his family and friends for their unwavering support. 
1. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to William F. Elkins (Nov. 21, 1864), in ARCHER 
H. SHAW, THE LINCOLN ENCYCLOPEDIA (1950). 
2. Susan Koniak et al., Op-Ed., How Washington Abetted the Bank Job, N.Y. 
1
CRAIN_Final_Formattedv1 7/16/2012  12:14 PM 
544 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:2 
recognition of the threats posed by such malfeasance shows that it has 
been an issue since the formative days of the United States. The 
significance of that issue has expanded substantially since those days. In 
2009, forty-four of the one hundred largest economic entities in the 
world were corporations. In the same year, Wal-Mart’s revenues 
exceeded the GDP of 174 countries.
3
 The emergence of corporate entities 
of this size exacerbates the potential harm caused by corporate 
malfeasance. Civil liability to individuals harmed by corporate 
malfeasance may be the best means of controlling these corporations and 
thus deterring corruption.
4
 In September, 2010, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit narrowed the extent of that liability in 
Kiobel, which declared that corporations are not cognizable defendants in 
ATS suits. This Comment argues that it did so erroneously. 
The ATS, enacted in 1789, confers federal subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear claims brought by aliens that arise under the “law of 
nations,” or, in modern language customary international law (CIL): 
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”5 Since 1980, this concise statute has 
generated controversy and precipitated substantial confusion.
6
 Much of 
the controversy stems from the unique nature of the statute, as no other 
country has a comparable law. Additionally, it stems from the fact that 
the litigation of extraterritorial tortious conduct perpetrated by 
defendants not based in the United States may infringe the sovereignty of 
the country in which the conduct occurred and from which the defendant 
resides. From a domestic viewpoint, such litigation raises further issues 
concerning the proper allocation of judicial resources. Over the past forty 
years, courts have struggled to interpret and apply the ATS, due largely 
to these issues. 
 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at WK10. 
3. Tracey Keys & Thomas W. Malnight, Strategy Dynamics Global Ltd., Corporate 
Clout: The Influence of the World’s Largest 100 Economic Entities, SCRIBD, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/47360746/Corporate-Clout-World-s-Largest-Economic-Entiti 
es-Presentation (last visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
4. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996). 
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2011). 
6. See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3661.1 (3d ed. 1998) (finding “controversy in virtually every instance in which the [ATS] 
has been considered,” and noting that “critical questions” remain unanswered about the 
scope of the ATS). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/11
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Nevertheless, it has been used increasingly to litigate alleged 
violations of human rights and environmental law, especially in the 
Second Circuit—where Kiobel was decided.7 Still, no comprehensive 
analytical approach to the ATS exists. Furthermore, many issues remain 
unresolved in ATS jurisprudence. 
 
Because appellate review of ATS suits has been so 
uncommon, there remain a number of unresolved issues 
lurking in our ATS jurisprudence—issues that we have 
simply had no occasion to address in the handful of 
cases we have decided in the thirty years since the 
revival of the ATS.
8
 
 
Kiobel addressed “one such unresolved issue: Does the jurisdiction 
granted by the ATS extend to civil actions brought against corporations 
under the law of nations?”9 The ATS states only that federal courts can 
hear certain tort claims—it fails to dictate who those tort claims can be 
brought against.
10
 Kiobel, for the first time, explicitly resolved the issue, 
holding that corporations are not cognizable defendants in ATS suits. 
Before Kiobel, courts heard ATS cases against any defendant over whom 
the court could gain personal jurisdiction, including corporations. 
Scholars both lauded and derogated the inclusion of corporations as the 
statute’s most critical impact.11 For this reason, the Kiobel decision 
 
7. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (only ATS case to reach 
the Supreme Court); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (first modern 
ATS decision). Other Second Circuit ATS cases include: Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 
F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 
F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d 
Cir. 2007); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Bigio v. Coca-
Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 
(2d Cir. 2000); Kadic v. Karadzĭć, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
8. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g 
denied en banc, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011). 
9. Id. (emphasis added). 
10. It “does not specify who is liable.” Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
11. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and 
Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971 (2004); Luis Enrique Cuervo, The 
Alien Tort Statute, Corporate Accountability, and the New Lex Petrolea, 19 TULANE 
ENVTL. L.J. 151 (2006); Lorelle Londis, Comment, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act: How an Old Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global 
Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141 (2005). 
3
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substantially threatens the efficacy of the ATS. 
The decision hinges on which body of law should govern the scope 
of liability under the ATS, or, more specifically, which body of law 
should determine whether corporations can be held liable under the ATS. 
CIL is clearly the body of law that must be violated in order for an ATS 
claim to lie. It does not necessarily follow, however, that CIL should 
provide the scope of liability available under the ATS. Judge Cabranes 
ruled that CIL (which does not hold corporations liable for tort 
violations) limits ATS subject matter jurisdiction to claims brought 
against individuals and states.
12
 In heated contrast, Judge Leval argued 
that domestic federal common law (which allows for corporate liability) 
should be utilized to decide who can be held liable.
13
 This Comment 
discusses the debate between Judge Cabranes and Judge Leval from a 
choice-of-law perspective. 
Part I will examine the genesis of the ATS and outline the 
development of ATS jurisprudence, highlighting its uncertainty. Part II 
dissects the debate between Judge Cabranes and Judge Leval. Part III 
will briefly explain relevant choice-of-law theory, and outline the choice-
of-law issues presented by the ATS. Part III then critiques the choice-of-
law analysis in Kiobel. It then suggests that courts adopt an approach to 
guide similar issues arising in the future. Courts should (1) recognize the 
choice-of-law issues inherent in the ATS, and (2) resolve those issues by 
consulting the law that most accords with the underlying purpose of the 
ATS. This Comment will conclude by positing that, under this approach, 
the Kiobel court should have applied domestic federal common law, and 
ruled that corporations can be held liable in ATS claims. Such a ruling 
comports with the purpose underlying the ATS. 
 
II.  Brief History of ATS Litigation and the Limited Role of Choice of 
Law Doctrine 
 
In 1781, the Continental Congress adopted a resolution encouraging 
states to enact legislation addressing several “specific offences ‘against 
the law of nations,’” including “‘violations of safe conducts’ and 
 
12. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 145. 
13. Id. at 149-96 (Leval, J., concurring). Judge Leval wrote a concurrence (both 
opinions agreed that the specific tortious conduct alleged did not rise to the level of a 
violation of CIL), but Judge Leval disagreed sharply with Judge Cabranes’ determination 
that corporations could not be held liable under the ATS. See id. at 182-84. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/11
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‘infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other public 
ministers,’” and “infractions of treaties and conventions to which the 
United States are a party.”14 The resolution recommended that the states 
“authorise suits to be instituted for damages by the party injured, and for 
compensation to the United States for damage sustained by them from an 
injury done to a foreign power by a citizen.”15 Commentators have 
interpreted the resolution as one aimed at ensuring that the United States 
complies with international norms by providing redress to foreigners 
harmed by United States citizens.
16
 Ultimately, the resolution 
precipitated the enactment of the ATS in 1789, and so provides the initial 
guidance in determining Congress’ intent.17 
No record of the congressional debate exists, thereby making it 
difficult to determine any legislative intent.
18
 There is, however, 
consensus based on (1) the language of the 1781 resolution and the ATS, 
and (2) scholarly commentary and historical context from the time 
period.
19
 Congress enacted the ATS to ensure that the nation and its 
citizens complied with the law of nations. “Virtually every commentator 
on the Statute has tied it to the Framers’ desire to avoid embroiling the 
nation in conflicts with foreign states arising from U.S. mistreatment of 
foreign citizens.”20 The ATS, therefore, was designed as a means for the 
 
14. Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the Law of Nations in the Context of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act and International Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 193, 223 
(2005) (quoting 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 1136-37 
(Gaillard Hunt ed. 1912)). 
15. Id. 
16. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A 
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 475 (1989) (“The Alien Tort Statute was a direct 
response to what the Founders understood to be the nation's duty to propagate and 
enforce those international law rules that directly regulated individual conduct.”). 
17. Trnavci, supra note 14, at 223. 
18. Burley, supra note 16, at 463 (“In the end, however, definitive proof of the 
intended purpose and scope of the Alien Tort Statute is impossible.”); Trnavci, supra 
note 14, at 226-27. 
19. See, e.g., Trnavci, supra note 14, at 215 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *68) (“Offenses against the law of nations can rarely be the object of the 
criminal law of any particular state . . . . But where the individuals of any state violate 
this general law, it is then the interest as well as the duty of the government under which 
they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity, that the peace of the world 
may be maintained.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20. Burley, supra note 16, at 465 (citing Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute 
and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L. L. 62 (1988); William R. Casto, 
The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law 
of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 489-98 (1986); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of 
5
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young and vulnerable nation to comply with the norms of international 
conduct, by providing a forum in the federal courts to remedy U.S. 
mistreatment of foreign citizens.
21
 
There are several theories as to why Congress provided that forum. 
One suggests that Congress intended only to protect foreign ambassadors 
in the wake of an embarrassing 1784 attack on a French ambassador in 
Philadelphia.
22
 Another posits that Congress was compelled by a sense of 
chivalrous duty: “Their motives derived not only from a negative 
calculation of the immediate national security consequences if they did 
not comply, but also from a positive conception of conduct befitting a 
civilized nation.”23 A third, the “denial of justice theory,” 24 holds that the 
statute derived from a desire to avoid adjudication in state courts. At the 
time, Congress viewed state courts as provincial, discriminating against 
foreigners, and therefore incapable of providing impartial decisions.
25
 
James Madison clearly articulated this concern: “We well know, sir, that 
foreigners cannot get justice done them in these [state] courts, and this 
has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among 
us.”26 Discriminatory judgments would both embarrass and endanger the 
young nation. 
Whichever theory one uses, scholars generally accept that Congress 
intended to provide a forum for redress to aliens injured by a violation of 
some international rule, so long as that rule was understood to bind 
“individuals for the benefit of other individuals[,which] overlapped with 
the norms of state relationships.”27 In the first 191 years following 
 
Nations Is Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 44-45 
(1952); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: 
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 19-22 (1985); John 
M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals “Violate” International Law, 21 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988)). See also Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of 
Decision for Issues Arising Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 464 
(2007). 
21. See Trnavci, supra note 14, at 224 n.133 (listing supportive secondary 
authorities). 
22. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 242 n.13 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(citing Casto, supra note 20, at 499). 
23. Burley, supra note 16, at 464. 
24. Id. at 465. 
25. Id. 
26. Trnavci, supra note 14, at 227 (quoting 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 583 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
2d ed. 1881)). 
27. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/11
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enactment, only two ATS actions were brought.
28
 This changed, 
however, when the “birth of the modern line of [ATS] cases,” 29 occurred 
with a 1980 case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
In Filartiga both parties were Paraguayan citizens. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendant, as Inspector General of Police in Paraguay, 
and acting under the color of state authority, tortured and killed their son 
Joelito Filartiga.
30
 Judge Kaufman held that the ATS provided 
jurisdiction over a case involving torture perpetrated by a state official 
that violated the law of nations.
31
 Filartiga began a wave of ATS 
litigation involving violations of human rights and environmental norms 
(the two main areas in which CIL operates). 
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided its only ATS case, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The plaintiff, Humberto 
Alvarez-Machain, was a Mexican national whom other Mexicans, 
including Sosa, abducted in the course of a U.S. DEA operation.
32
 The 
DEA had him abducted so that he could stand trial in the United States 
for the torture and murder of a DEA agent.
33
 The court acquitted 
Alvarez-Machain, and he brought suit under the jurisdiction provided by 
the ATS.
34
 The district court granted Alvarez’ motion for summary 
judgment against Sosa and awarded $25,000 in damages.
35
 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the relevant 
portion of that decision.
36
 After decades of calls for Supreme Court 
clarification of the ATS, the Court granted certiorari.
37
 
The majority decision, written by Justice Souter, set forth two 
important (and surprising) clarifications. Before Sosa, most 
commentators interpreted the ATS only as a jurisdictional statute that 
 
28. See 14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, at § 3661.1. 
29. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25. 
30. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
31. Id. at 880.  
32. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697-99. 
33. Id. at 698. 
34. Id. Defendants included both the United States and Sosa. Id. The ATS was used 
only to invoke jurisdiction over the Mexican parties; jurisdiction over the U.S. was 
provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives sovereign immunity in certain 
situations. Id. 
35. Id. at 699. 
36. Id. 
37. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003). 
7
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created no new cause of action.
38
 “Instead, the Court recognized that the 
ATS, in addition to conferring jurisdiction on federal courts for cases 
within its ambit, also recognized limited common law causes of action 
for aliens seeking to sue in American federal courts.”39 Although the 
ATS did not “create” causes of action, it, therefore, does facilitate 
recognition of causes of action based on certain international norms, 
recognizing such claims as sounding in federal common law.
40
 
Second, the Court, considering ATS’ historical origins, outlined a 
new test for determining which rules of CIL could provide federal causes 
of action under the ATS: to be actionable a claim must rest on an 
international norm “accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” 
that Congress recognized, namely violations of safe conducts, 
infringements on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.
41
 To qualify as 
CIL for the purpose of ATS claims, a rule must be “specific, universal, 
and obligatory.”42 “In short, customary international law is composed 
only of those rules that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a 
sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”43 Violations of CIL, under 
this test, include torture, genocide, and crimes against humanity. 
Sosa clarified the substantive law that must be violated in order for 
the ATS to provide jurisdiction. Violation of a specific, universal, and 
obligatory norm of CIL results in a federal cause of action cognizable 
under the subject-matter jurisdiction grant of the ATS.
44
 It did not, 
however, define potential defendants of such claims. Most importantly, it 
left open the question of whether corporations could be held liable for 
violations falling within the parameters set forth by the Court. 
Kiobel addressed that question, and, in doing so, highlighted the 
evolution of ATS jurisprudence.
45
 Earlier cases focused only on whether 
there was a violation of CIL; Kiobel recognizes two inquiries embedded 
in ATS litigation.
46
 First, a court must determine whether the defendant 
 
38. Scarborough, supra note 20, at 468. 
39. Id. 
40. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 (quoting Casto, supra note 20, at 479-80). 
41. Id. at 725. 
42. Id. at 732 (quoting Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 
1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
43. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003). 
44. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475). 
45. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). 
46. Id. at 128. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/11
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falls within the scope of liability created by the ATS.
47
 This is the “who” 
question.
48
 One commentator describes this as the “threshold” test.49 
Second, the court must determine whether a violation of CIL has 
occurred.
50
 This is the “what” question.51 The next section discusses the 
Kiobel decision and critiques its choice of law for the threshold question 
under the ATS: in answering the “who” question Kiobel consulted the 
wrong law. 
 
III.  The Kiobel Decision 
 
Kiobel was brought in 2002 and now reflects a decade of 
groundbreaking ATS jurisprudence. It was one of the first cases to 
determine that the allegations set forth in the complaint satisfied the Sosa 
standard.
52
 Now, the Second Circuit’s ruling that corporations are not 
proper defendants in ATS cases makes it a landmark case. 
Since 1958, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 
Ltd. (“SPDC”) has conducted oil production and exploration operations 
in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.
53
 SPDC is a subsidiary of the Kiobel 
foreign defendants: Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (“Royal Dutch”), 
incorporated in the Netherlands, and Shell Transport and Trading 
Company PLC (“Shell”), incorporated in the United Kingdom.54 In 
response to the environmental degradation SPDC’s operations caused, 
the people of Ogoni organized the “Movement for Survival of Ogoni 
People,” a resistance group.55 The Kiobel plaintiffs, members of the 
group, alleged that in 1993 the defendants solicited Nigerian government 
aid to quell the resistance and actively facilitated the ensuing two years 
of attacks, murders, looting, and destruction committed by government 
agents.
56
 “Specifically, plaintiffs allege[d] that defendants, inter alia, (1) 
 
47. Id. 
48. Kenneth Anderson, Extra Thoughts on Today’s 2nd Circuit ATS Decision, 
OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2010, 10:49 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/extra-
thoughts-on-todays-2nd-circuit-ats-decision/. 
49. Id. 
50. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128. 
51. Anderson, supra note 48. 
52. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 125-26. 
53. Id. at 123. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
9
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provided transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to 
be utilized as a staging ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers 
involved in the attacks, and (4) provided compensation to those 
soldiers.”57 
The plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the Southern District of 
New York.
58
 The defendants moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state 
a claim, relying on Sosa.59 In 2005, Magistrate Judge Pitman issued a 
Report and Recommendation recommending denial of that motion for 
procedural reasons—the defendants raised their Sosa arguments too 
late.
60
 District Judge Wood heard Sosa arguments and allowed 
supplemental briefs before ruling on the defendants’ objections to the 
Magistrate Judge’s Report.61 
Relying on Sosa, Judge Wood dismissed the claims that CIL did not 
define with sufficient particularity: aiding and abetting; property 
destruction; forced exile; extrajudicial killing; and interfering with the 
rights to life, liberty, security, and association.
62
 Judge Wood denied the 
defendants’ motion regarding the other claims, which she found satisfied 
the Sosa standard: aiding and abetting; arbitrary arrest and detention; 
crimes against humanity; and torture or other cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment.
63
 Judge Wood’s decision was then certified for 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
64
 This certification 
recognized the “importance of the issues presented and the substantial 
grounds for difference of opinion.”65 
The Court of Appeals reversed the partial denial of the motion to 
dismiss.
66
 Judge Cabranes, writing for himself and Judge Jacobs, held 
that CIL, not domestic law, determines the scope of liability under ATS, 
because the ATS only confers jurisdiction where violations of CIL are 
found.
67
 
 
57. Id. 
58. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 463-65, 467. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 467-68. 
65. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010). 
66. Id. at 149. 
67. Much of Judge Cabranes’ decision focuses on supporting the proposition that 
corporations cannot be held liable under CIL. See generally id. This discussion focuses 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/11
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But the substantive law that determines our jurisdiction 
under the ATS is neither the domestic law of the United 
States nor the domestic law of any other country. By 
conferring subject matter jurisdiction over a limited 
number of offenses defined by customary international 
law, the ATS requires federal courts to look beyond 
rules of domestic law.
68
 
 
Judge Cabranes thus recognized the choice-of-law issue presented by the 
ATS, and resolved that issue by simply consulting the language of the 
statute. He essentially viewed it as an issue of statutory interpretation: 
because ATS jurisdiction rests on violations of CIL, CIL defines both 
substantive liability and permissible defendants. The ATS “imposes 
liability only for a ‘violation of the law of nations,’ and thus it leaves the 
question of the nature and scope of liability—who is liable for what—to 
customary international law.”69 Judge Cabranes noted that previous 
decisions finding corporations liable were not dispositive on the issue of 
corporate amenability to tort actions under CIL.70 He rested on two 
arguments: (1) that in non-ATS cases courts have interpreted CIL to 
define liability for violations of its norms, and (2) that ATS precedent is 
consistent with such an interpretation.
71
 
The first point he made was that CIL speaks affirmatively on the 
issue of permissible defendants and excludes corporations.
72
 He cites the 
decisions of the Nuremburg trials to support his contention. The 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg explicitly rejected the 
 
solely on Kiobel’s analysis of which law should determine the scope of liability: CIL or 
domestic law. It is essentially undisputed that CIL does not recognize corporations as 
juridical entities. Id. at 119 (“[T]he principle of individual liability for violations of 
international law has been limited to natural persons--not ‘juridical’ persons such as 
corporations--because the moral responsibility for a crime so heinous and unbounded as 
to rise to the level of an ‘international crime’ has rested solely with the individual men 
and women who have perpetrated it.”). 
68. Id. at 117-18 (emphasis in original). 
69. Id. at 122 (internal citations omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
70. Id. at 124-25 (“‘[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior 
decisions sub silentio,’ the Court ‘has never considered itself bound when a subsequent 
case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before it.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Hagans 
v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974)). 
71. See generally id. 
72. Id. at 125-26. 
11
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defendants’ argument that international law acts only upon states, and 
does not act upon individuals.
73
 In so doing, the Tribunal, which acted as 
body of CIL, affirmatively resolved the issue of “who” could be held 
liable for violations of its norms. Judge Cabranes interpreted this as a 
declaration by CIL that it alone governs the issue of who can be subject 
to it. Judge Cabranes argued that, because CIL purports to define “the 
subjects of international law,” only CIL can define the scope of liability 
for violations of its norms. 
Judge Cabranes’ second point was that “Sosa and [o]ur [p]recedents 
[r]equire [u]s to [l]ook to [i]nternational [l]aw to [d]etermine the [s]cope 
of [l]iability.”74 Several cases, including Sosa, seem to support his 
position.
75
 However, no previous case addressed the issue except in 
passing, and those that did address it had no actual choice-of-law 
analysis. He relied most heavily on two statements in Sosa. First, “a 
related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if 
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or an individual.”76 
According to Cabranes, this implies that CIL (i.e., international law) is 
the source of law that determines the scope of liability in ATS cases.
77
 
Second, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Sosa noted that “[t]he norm of 
international law must extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a 
private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.”78 Taken together, these 
quotations do provide guidance, and perhaps represent Cabranes’ 
strongest argument. Neither, however, comes in the context of any actual 
choice-of-law analysis, and both are only dictum. 
Judge Cabranes cited a few other cases that seem consistent with his 
position. He argued that, in Filartiga, the court “looked to international 
law to determine our jurisdiction and to delineate the type of defendant 
who could be sued.”79 It is certainly true that the court looked to CIL to 
determine jurisdiction. The ATS, however, mandates that violations of 
CIL are what create federal jurisdiction, and it is silent on all other 
 
73. Id. at 127 (citing The Nuremberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 
110 (Int'l Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1946)). 
74. Id. at 127. 
75. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28 (2004). 
76. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 127-28 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
79. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880, 889 
(2d Cir. 1980)). 
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issues.
80
 The Second Circuit’s decision to look to CIL on the 
jurisdictional issue cannot be read as an endorsement that CIL should 
determine the scope of liability issue. Furthermore, Judge Cabranes’ 
statement that the Court looked to CIL to determine “the type of 
defendant who could be sued”81 does not represent a fair reading of the 
case. The language in Filartiga which he relies on in support of this 
contention is: “[i]n light of the universal condemnation of torture in 
numerous international agreements . . . we find that an act of torture 
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates . . . the 
law of nations.”82 That quotation shows only that the court looked to CIL 
(“universal condemnation of torture in numerous international 
agreements”) to find that torture is cognizable under the ATS.83 It did not 
look to it to find who can be held liable for torture; that issue was not 
addressed. In order for the quotation to reflect Judge Cabranes’ position, 
the quotation would have to read: “in light of the universal condemnation 
of torture perpetrated by state officials, we find an act of torture 
committed by a state official to be a violation of the law of nations.” 
Judge Cabranes goes on to cite several cases;
84
 however, almost all 
of the citations suffer from the same underlying problem: just because 
they talk about individuals does not mean they address the question of 
corporate liability—they simply reflect the facts of the case. The 
citations that do address the issue do not come from the majority 
opinion.
85
 In any event, the cases cited in the discussion regarding choice 
of law in ATS jurisprudence illustrate the substantial confusion and lack 
of certainty by which courts have navigated ATS litigation. As such, no 
precedent mandates a certain outcome on this issue; courts have simply 
not addressed the issue with anything resembling an adequate level of 
analysis. 
In sum, Judge Cabranes failed to set forth a convincing argument 
that the ATS mandates looking to CIL to determine the “who” issue. His 
 
80. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2011). 
81. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889). 
82. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880). 
83. Id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d 880). 
84. Id. Among the cases cited were: Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 
254-66 (2d Cir. 2003); Kadic v. Karadzĭć, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
85. Id. (“We have repeatedly emphasized that the scope of the [ATS's] 
jurisdictional grant should be determined by reference to international law.” (quoting 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J. 
concurring))). 
13
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entire argument rested on his determination that the language of the ATS 
requires that CIL determine all ATS issues. While he must be 
commended for recognizing that the “who” question must be addressed, 
neither the language of the ATS, nor the nature of CIL, lead to such a 
conclusion. Judge Leval concurred in the judgment but sharply disagreed 
with Cabranes’ analysis of the corporate defendant issue.86 He did not 
explicitly perform any choice-of-law analysis, but his discussion focused 
on factors that courts traditionally use in choice-of-law analysis.
87
 As 
such, using the terminology of choice of law would make his argument 
more coherent. 
Judge Leval argued that international law takes no position on the 
scope of liability issues.
88
 He argued that CIL provides the norms and 
domestic law provides the remedies, or at least against whom the 
remedies are available.
89
 This is the strength of Leval’s position—he 
recognized that the “who” and the “what” question are conceptually 
separable, and can be addressed by separate bodies of law.
90
 
Furthermore, the argument is consistent with CIL’s purpose to protect 
human rights and the ATS’s purpose to provide a forum for remedy 
when those rights are violated.
91
 He interpreted precedent, namely Sosa, 
as making it “clear that a damage remedy does lie under the ATS.”92 He 
then focused on policy—that there should be a way to hold corporations 
liable for violations of the norm of CIL.
93
 
 
86. Id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring). 
87. Id. at 149. 
88. Specifically, Judge Leval contends: 
 
The position of international law on whether civil liability should be 
imposed for violations of its norms is that international law takes no 
position and leaves that question to each nation to resolve. 
International law, at least as it pertains to human rights, consists 
primarily of a sparse body of norms, adopting widely agreed 
principles prohibiting conduct universally agreed to be heinous and 
inhumane. Having established these norms of prohibited conduct, 
international law says little or nothing about how those norms should 
be enforced. 
 
Id. at 152. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 153. 
93. See id. at 150. 
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Judge Leval presented the more persuasive argument because it uses 
the choice-of-law analytical tools, although without explicitly 
acknowledging them. He recognized that the choice exists. He looks to 
the purpose of the ATS and its policy implications to make the 
determination. His argument would be stronger if he stated it in choice-
of-law terms. The next section will elaborate how that might be done. 
 
IV.  Choice-of-Law Doctrine and the ATS 
 
Choice-of-law doctrine is a unique and amorphous
94
 body of legal 
principles that attempt to guide courts in deciding which law to apply 
when more than one body of laws speaks to the issue at hand.
95
 It does 
not select jurisdiction, but simply speaks to the law that a given 
jurisdiction should apply. There is no uniform choice-of-law principle—
issues are adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, and different forums tend 
to espouse different guiding principles.
96
 This Part will first briefly 
review relevant choice-of-law jurisprudence. It will then examine the 
choice-of-law issues presented by the ATS, and assert two fundamental 
conclusions. First, the concise language of the ATS does not address 
which body of law should decide issues arising in ATS claims, and 
therefore courts need to engage in choice-of-law analysis when new 
issues arise. Second, the choice-of-law approach taken in a 2002 
Southern District of New York case—that district courts should decide 
ATS choice-of-law issues by reference to the body of law whose 
outcome comports with the remedies the ATS was intended to provide—
is the approach that all courts should adopt.
97
 
Choice-of-law theory provides no hard rules. It does, however, 
provide a set of principles that allow us to evaluate the underlying 
judicial, economic, and social policies that speak to any decision about 
the law to apply.
98
 In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), the 
 
94. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 1 (1998) (“Probably no area of law has been 
and continues to be more confused and confusing than that of conflict of laws.”). 
95. Id. at Summary (describing choice of law theory as addressing “the problem of 
what law governs in a given legal situation when there is a conflict between the law of 
one state or country and that of another.”). 
96. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES—
COMMENTS—QUESTIONS (8th ed. 2010) (illustrating the range and depth within the 
choice of law field). 
97. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
98. See generally CURRIE ET AL., supra note 96 (including sections on statutory 
solutions, the relationship between constitutions and conflicts of laws, and an entire 
15
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Supreme Court addressed choice-of-law issues arising under a statute 
similar to the ATS. That discussion elucidates the choice-of-law 
jurisprudence relevant to the ATS. 
The Jones Act holds that “[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal 
injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an 
action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such 
action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the 
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway 
employees shall apply.”99 Like the ATS, therefore, it is a statute that 
provides for subject matter jurisdiction of a specific type of tort. In 
Laurtizen, the plaintiff was a Danish seaman who, while temporarily in 
New York, joined the crew of a Danish ship owned by the defendant, 
who was also a Danish citizen.
100
 The plaintiff was then injured in 
Havana, and brought suit against the ship owner in the Southern District 
of New York under the jurisdiction provided by the Jones Act.101 A 
central issue in the case was whether Danish law (which limited remedy 
to the amount of damages incurred by the plaintiff in the twelve weeks 
following the injury), or U.S. law (which allowed for comprehensive 
remedy making the plaintiff whole) should be applied to determine the 
available remedy.
102
 Both the district court and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that U.S. law applied, pursuant to 
the language of the Act, and held for the plaintiff.
103
 The Supreme Court 
then granted the defendants a writ of certiorari, and reversed.
104
 
At the outset, Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, noted that 
“allowance of an additional remedy under our Jones Act would sharply 
conflict with the policy and letter of Danish law.”105 In the same way, to 
consult U.S. domestic law in answering the “who” question set forth by 
the ATS would conflict with CIL’s approach to the “who” question. For 
this reason, Justice Jackson’s choice of law analysis, as described below, 
will provide the reader with a basic understanding of choice-of-law 
analysis as it should apply to the ATS. 
 
chapter devoted to the difficulties of international conflicts). 
99. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 688 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C.A. § 
3104 (West 2011)). 
100. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 573 (1953). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 575-77. 
103. Id. at 573-74. 
104. Id. at 574, 593. 
105. Id. at 575. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/11
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Justice Jackson first looked to the legislative history underlying the 
Jones Act, and concluded that it favored the application of Danish law 
over U.S. domestic law.
106
 In particular, he noted that the Act was 
enacted within the context of a patchwork of maritime statutes with 
which it must be considered consistent. Jackson argued that these 
statutes, which usually “give no evidence” as to whether they should be 
applied to foreign transactions, are almost universally understood to 
apply only to “cases within the jurisdiction” of the United States.107 “By 
usage as old as the Nation, such statutes have been construed to apply 
only to areas and transactions in which American law would be 
considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law.”108 
Jackson concluded that the legislative history indicated an intent that the 
application of the statute not extend beyond the scope of traditional U.S. 
maritime law. 
The traditional practices of maritime law, according to Justice 
Jackson, mandate that “if any construction otherwise be possible, an Act 
will not be construed as applying to foreigners in respect to acts done by 
them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting.”109 
He then outlined the other factors which should be considered in 
“determining what law determines standards for adjudication in U.S. 
federal courts.”110 The factors are: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law 
of the flag (the nationality of the ship in maritime context); (3) allegiance 
or domicile of the injured party; (4) allegiance of the defendant; (5) place 
of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) the law of 
forum.
111
 Justice Jackson found that the factors show “an overwhelming 
preponderance in favor of Danish law.”112 
 
The parties are both Danish subjects, the events took 
place on a Danish ship, not within our territorial waters. 
Against these considerations is only the fact that the 
 
106. Id. at 577 (“But Congress in 1920 wrote these all-comprehending words, not 
on a clean slate, but as a postscript to a long series of enactments governing shipping.”). 
107. Id. at 577-78. 
108. Id. at 577. 
109. Id. at 578 (quoting Regina v. Jameson, (1896) 2 Q.B. 425 at 430 (Eng.)). 
110. Tracey Bishop Holton, Causes of Action to Recover Civil Damages Pursuant 
to the Law of Nations and/or Customary International Law, 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 327 
at § 8 (2010) (originally published in 2003). 
111. Id. (citing Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-90). 
112. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 592. 
17
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defendant was served here with process and that the 
plaintiff signed on in New York, where the defendant 
was engaged in our foreign commerce. The latter event 
is offset by provision of his contract that the law of 
Denmark should govern.
113
 
 
While the majority of the decision addressed these factors, legislative 
intent seemed to play the most substantial role in his ultimate 
determination. 
Lauritzen provided a list of factors to be considered in maritime 
choice-of-law analysis, and thus provided insight into the application of 
choice of law doctrine unique to the ATS.
114
 The subsequent utilization 
of these factors illustrates the fluidity of choice-of-law doctrine. First, 
that list is in no way comprehensive or guiding, often one factor can 
carry the day despite weighing against all other factors. The Supreme 
Court noted this in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, stating that the factors 
are “not [] mechanical,” and “not intended as exhaustive.”115 Moreover, 
“[t]he significance of one or more factors must be considered in light of 
the national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction.”116 
Second, this overriding requirement that any decision comport with the 
legislative history and intent underlying the statute in question has 
resulted in changes to the factors. In fact, the Hellenic Lines decision also 
added an eighth factor: “the shipowner’s base of operations.”117 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has refused to give credence to the last 
three factors, finding them almost universally irrelevant.
118
 
Of course, the context of the ATS exacerbates this fluidity, because 
the Lauritzen factors are grounded in maritime law. Still, the factors are 
relevant in that they illustrate the importance of reaching a decision that 
comports with the purpose of the statute in question and that considers 
the level of contacts between the forum, the parties, and the facts at hand. 
 
113. Id. 
114. See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382 (1959) 
(holding that the Lauritzen factors apply in all maritime cases). 
115. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-9 (1970). 
116. Id. at 309. 
117. Id. 
118. See Reino de España v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 729 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638-39 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Carbotrade S.p.A. v. Bureau Veritas, 99 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“[A]pprovingly citing scholarship for the proposition that the last three factors 
serve no relevant purpose and have been denigrated.”)). 
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Having developed a basic understanding of the framework that guides 
choice-of-law determinations similar to that posed by the ATS, this 
Comment will now turn to a discussion of the choice-of-law issues 
presented by the ATS, and argue that the Kiobel decision’s underlying 
weakness is its interpretation that choice-of-law analysis is not necessary 
due to the plain language of the ATS. The ATS, as many commentators 
and cases have acknowledged, is a statute rife with choice-of-law 
issues.
119
 This is a result of two factors. First, the statute consists of a 
single sentence—its plain language fails to comprehensively lay out 
which law should apply to various steps in adjudication of ATS claims. 
The plain language simply states that a tort that violates CIL can be 
litigated in federal court. This does not clarify whether courts shall apply 
federal law, international law, the domestic law where the wrong 
occurred, or state law to issues such as scope of liability, procedural 
issues, issues of equity, etc. Second, the ATS comes with virtually no 
legislative history or early case law to clarify how adjudication should 
proceed.
120
 As a result of this lack of guidance, contemporary courts have 
struggled to recognize the available choice-of-law issues inherent to the 
ATS, and to subsequently navigate those choices. Still, some case law, at 
the very least, confirms that choice of law is an important consideration 
in ATS cases. 
First, the Second Circuit in Filartiga explicitly recognized the 
choice-of-law issues underlying the ATS. 
 
Pena . . . confuses the question of federal jurisdiction 
under the Alien Tort Statute, which requires 
consideration of the law of nations, with the issue of the 
choice of law to be applied, which will be addressed at a 
 
119. See, e.g., Holton, supra note 110 (compiling sources). Compare Xuncax v. 
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180-83 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that international law 
provides substantive law for ATS cases), with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 
F.2d 774, 777-82 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that, while 
international law triggers jurisdiction under ATCA, tort laws of forum state might 
provide substantive causes of action), and Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 
978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (approving district court procedure that based 
jurisdiction on international law but applied tort law of state where underlying events 
occurred). See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that 
ATS establishes causes of action for violations of international law but requiring the 
district court to perform a traditional choice-of-law analysis to determine whether 
international law, law of forum state, or law of state where events occurred should 
provide substantive law in such an action). 
120. See discussion supra Part I. 
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later stage in the proceedings. The two issues are 
distinct. Our holding on subject matter jurisdiction 
decides only whether Congress intended to confer 
judicial power, and whether it is authorized to do so by 
Article III. The choice of law inquiry is a much broader 
one, primarily concerned with fairness, consequently, it 
looks to wholly different considerations.
121
 
 
The court then noted that this analysis might very well require the court 
to apply Paraguayan law.
122
 In the same, vein, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in, In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos 
Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992), upheld 
jurisdiction under the ATS and then applied Philippine law to the issue of 
damages. In Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995), the 
court found that the liability of the defendant was established under 
Guatemalan law, but that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for 
defamation pursuant to Kentucky state law. 
One case provides arguably the most valuable insight into the 
choice-of-law analysis, and provides the guiding doctrine which all 
courts should adopt. In Tachiona v. Mugabe, “the court sought to 
harmonize cases eschewing appropriate choice of law analysis.”123 The 
court advocated a flexible approach to choice-of-law issues in ATS 
cases, as a result of “the practical and jurisprudential complexities that 
inhere in discerning, construing and enforcing substance rules formulated 
by foreign courts, legislative and administrative bodies.”124 
 
Were the federal courts obliged to give unremitting 
recognition and deference to the substantive laws and 
defenses compelled by municipal law under a choice of 
law analysis, in some instances such application of 
foreign law could frustrate the right of action the [ATS] 
was designed to confer upon the victims of international 
lawlessness.
125
 
 
121. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889 (internal citations omitted) (citing Home Ins. Co. v. 
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1954)). 
122. Id. at 889 n.25. 
123. Holton, supra note 110, at § 8. 
124. Id. 
125. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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A flexible approach would allow courts to draw rules of decision “from: 
federal common law; the forum state; the foreign jurisdiction most 
affected; international law; or a combination of these sources”126 if they 
provide a remedy adequate to “redress the international law violations in 
question.”127 This approach is wise for two reasons: (1) it recognizes the 
complexity inherent in ATS choice of law, and allows federal courts 
flexibility in addressing that complexity, and (2) it provides a guiding 
principle by which to navigate ATS choice of law that conforms with the 
purpose and plain language of the ATS: the provision of forum, and thus 
remedy, where there has been a violation of CIL by a United States 
citizen or entity. 
The difficulty underlying ATS choice of law is certainly evidenced 
by the strongly-worded disagreement between two respected jurists that 
we find in Kiobel.128 This disagreement suggests that the language of the 
ATS fails to address the issue, and that there is a tangible conflict about 
which body of law should apply to the scope of liability determination. 
Choice-of-law theory provides valuable insight into that determination. It 
seems clear that the ATS allows for a choice of law, at least in regards to 
the scope of liability issue.
129
 As described above, Judge Cabranes’ 
 
126. Id. at 411. 
127. See id. at 418. (emphasis added). 
128. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,122-23 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Judge Cabranes notes “the passion with which Judge Leval disagrees with our holding . . 
. he calls our reasoning ‘illogical’ on nine separate occasions . . . he calls our conclusions 
‘strange,’ . . . he repeatedly criticizes our analysis as ‘internally inconsistent.’”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
129. See e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 
261 n.12 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We will also assume, without deciding, that corporations . . . 
may be held liable for the violations of customary international law that plaintiffs 
allege.”); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,282-83 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that, because defendants did not raise the issue, the 
court need not reach the question of corporate liability); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 321-25 
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing the view that 
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 
1057, 1143-45 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that there is no corporate liability under the 
ATS because CIL determines the scope of jurisdiction, without an explicit choice of law 
analysis); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that ATS 
provided SMJ over an American oil corporation, based on the allegation of a violation of 
CIL). For the most comprehensive discussion of the choice-of-law issue presented in 
Kiobel, see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the choices of law available in ATS jurisprudence, including federal common 
law, state law, and CIL, and noting that as long as a forum's rule does not violate binding 
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argument stems from a statutory interpretation that the language of the 
ATS dictates that CIL determines all issues. Conversely, Judge Leval’s 
argument touches on many arguments that are relevant in a choice-of-law 
determination, although he never explicitly acknowledges the 
consideration of any choice-of-law principles. 
The major weakness underlying the debate in Kiobel is that Judge 
Cabranes and Judge Leval do not meet within the same framework. 
Judge Cabranes simply argued that CIL should apply, based on the 
nature of CIL and ATS precedents. Judge Leval, conversely, focused on 
his interpretation of the underlying humanitarian issues and results that 
will stem from not recognizing corporate liability. The lack of a guiding 
framework resulted in the harsh disagreement between the two; they 
were essentially attempting to adjudicate on different playing fields. An 
acknowledgement of the framework for choice-of-law set forth in 
Tachiona would allow courts to adjudicate ATS decisions in accordance 
with the purpose of the statute, and with a framework for a constructive 
debate. 
The purpose of the ATS was most likely to assure the international 
community that the United States would comply with the law of nations. 
Since enactment, CIL has evolved to focus on gross humanitarian and 
environmental offenses. While the nature of CIL has changed, the need 
for the United States to remedy violations perpetuated by both its citizens 
and its corporate entities still exists. The Kiobel decision eliminates the 
ability of the federal system to hold corporations accountable for CIL-
based torts. It is these torts, and the lack of remedy for their victims, that 
often provides the strongest impetus for the international community to 
view the United States negatively. As the world grows increasingly 
interdependent, it is not wise to eliminate one of the few remaining 
means of forum available to remedy such violations. Courts should adopt 
the choice-of-law standard articulated above, and focus on the provision 
of remedy for actual violations of CIL. The language of the ATS allows 
for the provision, and the underlying purpose demands it. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Kiobel signifies an acknowledgment that ATS litigation involves a 
 
norms of international law, notions of comity and the structures of the international and 
federal systems should give deference to the forum's particular embodiment of the 
international principle). 
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choice between a scope of liability as dictated by domestic law or as 
dictated by CIL. Choice-of-law theory provides insight into that decision. 
A petition for certiorari was filed July 12, 2011, and granted on October 
17, 2011. On February 28, 2012, the Court heard oral arguments.
130
 On 
Monday, March 5, the Court restored the case to the argument 
calendar—at the time of publication oral arguments are pending on the 
issue of extraterritoriality.
131
 
The Court should recognize the choice-of-law issues inherent in 
ATS cases, and establish a guiding framework for navigating those 
issues. This Comment recommends that it accord with the jurisprudence 
set forth in Tachiona and adopt a flexible standard. This standard will 
require courts to acknowledge the choice of laws available to them, and 
at the same time provide guidance that comports with the plain language 
purpose of the ATS: the provision of a forum and potential remedy for 
violations of CIL by United States citizens and entities. As corporations 
become more and more powerful, it is important that we not reduce our 
ability to hold them liable for gross violations of universally accepted 
norms. 
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